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Abstract
There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and
quantum mechanics1.  However,  ontologies  of  information are  rather  rare.  One of  the  reasons
behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing,
and not  with  ‘the  furniture  of  the  world’.  But  what  would  be  the  nature  of  an  ontology of
information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-
grammatical formalism. A candidate ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some
of the ideas of K. Turek,  presented in this paper.  Turek outlines the ontology of information
conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory,
offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and
logico-grammatical representations.
Key  words:  information,  formal  ontology  of  information,  set  theory,  form-matter  complex,
substance, structures, relations
1. Introduction
This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  present  selected  thoughts  of  K.  Turek,  a  Polish-language
philosopher  whose  writings  remain  inaccessible  to  non-Polish  speakers.  Turek  discusses  the
conceptualization of information, its formal ontology and its representation using the Z axiomatic
set theory. Turek’s ideas on the nature of information, though written between 1978 and 1981,
may still be of relevance today.
Turek perceived information as a formative element of the Universe2, and the third element
of reality in its own right, with matter3 and energy being the other two. Information in this view is
neither an abstract concept nor a number, nor a function or an algorithm4. Turek does not assume
that information has any non-natural qualities - it belongs to nature as we understand it in science,
without  any  mystical  or  metaphysical  (with  metaphysical  understood  as  “out-of-worldly”)
qualities. In Turek’s view, information is metaphysical in a sense of being at the foundations of
the real, retaining Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics. Metaphysics, as Aristotle conceived
of  it,  does not  deal  with something ‘after’ or  ‘beyond’ physics;  it  is  the study of nature but
understood in the most general terms. As Wilshire puts it: “...  metaphysics and natural science
hold the single realm of Nature as a common object of study....”5. Thus, in this view information is
the metaphysical concept  par excellence; its nature is fundamental to nature, but does not go
beyond it.
1   Any good book on metaphysics will contain an ontology section discussing basic properties of the Universe. See 
(Loux 1998),(Loux 2001),(Wilshire 1969),(Taylor 1992) Specific ontologies of physical phenomena can be found in 
books on the given subject, for example (Jammer 2000), (Janik 2010),(Whithrow 1975), (Bergman 1966) ,(Heller 
1990),  (Collins & Clark 2015).
2   Information, from this perspective, is as much a part of the physical universe as are matter or energy. However, it is 
also of a yet-unknown nature, in some ways like matter, space, time or energy. For the statement of the nature of energy
see for example (Feynman 1971).
3   Matter should not be understood here as a “stuff” like in Democritus, but as a prime matter, rather a potential 
formless.
4   This discussion relates to the fundamental ontological problem posed of the world of things, but this has not been 
explicated for information: Does information exist as ens per se (as an independent element) or ens ab alio (through the
existence of something else)? The simple and clear division into ens per se and ens ab alio appears not so obvious 
under closer scrutiny. However, as a first approximation of the problem of existence of things it is acceptable. 
5 (Wilshire 1969).
2 Information has been viewed as an element of reality by many philosophers, including Gitt,
Hidalgo, Weaver, Collier, Stonier,  Dodig-Crnkovic,  von Weizsaecker, and even Floridi with his
informational  structural  realism6 (among others).  So,  Turek is  not  on his  own.  However,  his
philosophy probes deeper than others into the nature of the ontology and its formal expressions –
and that is why I think it deserves to be more widely known.
The “third element” view of the nature of information in no way invalidates or diminishes
any of the concepts of information proposed by Shannon, Chaitin, Floridi, Fisher, Burgin, Carnap,
Bar-Hiller, Capurro, and many others working within a similar paradigm7 – it merely puts them in
a different perspective. Thus, Turek’s ideas should not be regarded as a conflicting proposal but as
another view of the nature of information that fits well with the current research in the area. As
we will  see,  these  views are  surprisingly close  to  most  modern concepts  of  information and
physics. 
Instead of publishing full translations of Turek’s papers, I have opted to present a selection of
his ideas most relevant to us today, supported by substantial quotations from his original writings 8
and a critical commentary. Of course, any imperfections in the presentation of Turek’s views are
my own.
The presentation of  Turek’s  concept  of  information will  be based on two of his  papers:
“Philosophical  aspects  of  the  concept  of  information”9 and  “Examination  of  the  concept  of
structure”10. They were both published in Polish in the journal Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
in 1978 and 1981, respectively. The first paper discusses the general concept of information and
its interpretation as a special kind of form. The second paper discusses analogies between the set
theory and the form-structure concepts of information. 
2. Turek’s information philosophy
2.1 Preliminaries
Information is used to denote many things; sometimes its meaning can extend well beyond
an original definition, making it a catch-all term for many diverse ideas, while sometimes it is
restricted to a very narrow domain as a technical  term without  meaning outside one specific
area11. Efforts to pin down the nature of information are reminiscent of Socrates’s struggle with
concepts of wisdom, virtue, or justice.
 
As  we  do  not  have  a  clear  conception  of  what  information  is,  we  cannot  formalize  its
ontology12, that is, formalizing in the sense of applying formal logical language and concepts.
Application  of  any  formal  method  (theory  of  categories,  theory  of  sets,  mereology  or
6  See for example (Hidalgo 2015), (Stonier 1990) (Gitt 2002) , (von Weizsacher 1971), (Collier 1990) (Dodig-
Crnkovic 2012), (Floridi 2010c).
7  For a fairly complete review of different information concepts see (Nafria 2010).
8   The presentation of Turek’s ideas on information focuses on the ontology of information while leaving out 
epistemological interpretations, which are included in Turek’s papers. 
9   (Turek 1978a).
10   (Turek 1978b).
11    What Turek wrote in the 1970s about the multivalent meaning of the concept has been echoed by Floridi (Floridi 
2010a)and many others. So, the situation has not changed; we just have more ‘definitions’ to choose from. 
12    The formal ontology of information bears the promise of capturing the essence of what information is, bringing the 
possibility of clarity to the over-complicated and over-crowded semantic space of information – a reward surely worth 
striving for.
3mereotopology are among possible candidates13) to the concept of information (as understood in
this paper) will fail, as we do not know what it is that we are trying to formalize14. 
We  lack  the  concepts  that  would  allow  us  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  intuitive
understanding of information and formal methods15. 
Informal ontologies of information may be based on the concepts of reality of Whitehead 16 or
the formal ontologies of Ingarden, among others; but the question of which of these should be
adopted as the ontology of information for formal methods is open 17. It seems to me that concepts
of form and structure, as proposed by Turek, are possible candidates (after some clarifications) for
the role of this ‘missing link’18. 
2.2 Form and Matter
The meaning of the term ‘information’ is derived from its Latin roots as ‘in-form-a(c)tion’;
the internal ‘in’ configuration makes it more of a process than a static element. The meaning of
this internal shape can be found in the concept of the ‘hylomorphism’, as Turek calls it – a form-
matter composite. 
2.2.1 Form Matter Composite
Turek’s form-matter composite is a very narrow concept in comparison to the Aristotelian
hylomorphism19, and as such it does not carry all the baggage of Aristotelian metaphysics20.  Form
is understood by Turek as an element shaping formless matter. It imposes upon it its external
contours or shape as well as its internal configuration21. 
The  form-matter  relationship  is  illustrated  by the  example  of  the  collection  of  identical
balls22. Say we have a collection of individual objects of the same form, e.g., balls of the same
external shape and internal constitution. Matter imposes individuality on every ball as each one is
an individual  thing.  Form shapes the matter  into individuals of  the same genus.  There is  no
priority between form and matter. Matter and form cannot exist separately. In the example the
balls are identical objects because of form, but individual objects because of matter23.
13     One such proposal is discussed in  (Smith 2009). Another discussion on the formal ontology of parts can be found 
in (Koslicki 2009). See also Ingarden for the application of the set theory to the modeling of information (Ingarden & 
Urbanik 1962).
14   To put it differently, the ontological interpretation of the formal methods in the context of information is not clear.
15   In applying formal methods to real things there is no escape from reality; the successful formal ontology of the 
reality “... should provide a logically perspicuous representation of our common-sense understanding of the world, and 
not just of our scientific understanding”. (Cocchiarella 2007). 
16   (Whitehead 1957), (Ingarden 1964), (Thomasson 2012).
17 Formal ontology can be explained as follows: “Formal ontology is both a theory of logical forms and a 
metaphysical theory about the ontological structure of the world. What makes it a theory of logical forms is that 
different ontological categories or modes of being are represented in it by different logico-grammatical categories. It is
specified in this regard by what might be called an ontological grammar that determines how the expressions of those 
logico-grammatical categories can be meaningfully combined so as to represent different ontological categories of the 
world” (Cocchiarella 2007). Thus, we may refer to Ingarden’s ontologies as formal ontologies as we may talk about 
formal ontologies when those ontologies are expressed in some sort of logical language.
18   This missing link is also called “the nexus of predication” by (Cocchiarella 2007).
19   Aristotelian hylomorphism obviously has several acute problems that stand to eliminate it, as it stands, as a model 
for information. See for example (Lesher 2013).
20   “Based on my analysis, I can conclude that information may be considered a new concept only if we consider anew
the narrowly understood Aristotelian concept of form” (Turek 1978a).
21   (Turek 1978b).
22   This example of identical balls does not include chaotic structures such as snowflakes or rock formations. For 
example, snowflakes are all unique, shaped by the environmental conditions at the time of formation. Such a process 
seems to fall outside Turek’s example. See (Anon 2015a), (Anon 2015b).
23“The Universe appears to us as composed of individual, separate, things. Let us take a collection of identical balls. 
We perceive it not as one ball but as a collection of individual elements, each one being a separate ball. Despite the 
42.2.2 Structure and Form
An abstract structure is a system with a given number of collections (sets24) and relations
between elements  of  those collections25.  An abstract  structure  can  be exemplified by a  DNA
polymer, an example of a highly organized complex of interconnected units of molecules forming
complexes at multiple levels from atomic to molecular. This is in fact a structure of structures,
i.e., a structure whose elements are other structures26.
The concept of a structure is contained in the concept of a form, which means that every
structure is a form, but not every form must be a structure. We can distinguish:
(1) forms reducible to structures, 
(2) forms containing structures, and 
(3) forms without structures. 
Turek postulates that “the concept of information is a subset of sets of forms reducible to
structures”27.
Forms reducible to structures are investigated by the natural sciences and may be described
by logic and mathematics or other formalisms28. Examples of such structure-forms are seen in
concepts of classical mechanics, expressed29 as follows:
((P,Re), s, f, m,g, E1,...Er)
“Elements of the set P are material points. In a set Re of real numbers we differentiate a
certain interval T, whose elements are time intervals (moments in time). Relations s,f,m,g, defined
over the sets P and Re, are basic, non-definable relations and denote notions of location, force
with which at a given moment a point acts on another material point, mass of a material point,
and the external forces acting on material points. Ei denotes the mathematical relations defined
fact that each one of them is a different element of a collection, we conceive of them under the same concept of ‘ball’, 
which corresponds to their (common) form. To explain the existence of many individuals of the same genus (having the 
same form) we have to introduce another element – a prime matter. The role of the prime matter is to impose 
individuality on forms. Form shapes matter, matter imposes on form individuality in the representatives of the same 
genus. There is no precedence in this is relationship that may be considered figuratively as interaction: matter or form 
cannot exist separately; they always constitute indivisible wholes. Balls are identical in form but different in matter, 
that is why we can perceive them as individuals.” (Turek 1978a).
24   Strictly speaking, it is a mistake to equate collections with sets.
25   (Turek 1978a).
26   The example comes close to the following interpretation of the Aristotelian form-matter composite: “On one 
understanding of matter, it is the counterpart of form – the stuff that gets informed – so that whenever there is a form 
there must also be some matter that serves as its subject. On this conception, there will often be hierarchies of matter, 
with the most basic stuff, prime matter, at the bottom, and various form-matter composites at higher levels, which may 
themselves be conceived of as the matter for some further form. Wood, for example, is a form-matter composite that 
can itself serve as the matter for a bed.” (Pasnau 2015). This common-sense interpretation of hylomorphism comes 
from medieval times (Solomon ibn Gabriol); it was controversial even then.
27   “The concept of a structure is contained in the concept of a form. This means that every structure is a form, but not
that every form must be a structure. In the simplest case, a form is a structure and as such can be expressed in the 
formalisms of mathematics and logic. Thus, we will differentiate three types of forms: (1) forms containing structures; 
(2) forms reducible to structures; (3) forms without structures. This differentiation is important if we assume that each 
existence is characterized by a certain form. In this context a question about the essence of information requires the 
precise description of the form that corresponds to this concept (of information). I will be attempting to demonstrate 
that the concept of information means a certain subset of sets of forms reducible to structures.” (Turek 1978a).
28   In this case it may be asserted that “[f]orm is an internal material content of the material being, as well as its 
internal and external configuration” (Turek 1978b).
29   The concept of a structure of natural sciences is taken from (Wojcicki 1997).
5by  the  theory  of  classical  mechanics.  The  statement  that  classical  mechanics  describes  in
approximation  a  certain  part  of  reality  is  equivalent  to  the  statement  that  the  structure  of
classical mechanics is ‘similar’ to the form of this part of reality”30.
Forms  containing structures,  but  not  reducible  to  structures,  are  forms  with (containing)
structures to which they are not equivalent. One form not reducible to a structure is the mind.
Some aspects of this form have structures that are an object of specific sciences such as biology,
psychology,  etc.  Nonstructural  parts  of  the  mind are  indicated by philosophy,  art,  and music
among others. Denying the unstructured part leads to a reductionist, mechanical or computerized
model of the mind31 as Turek asserts.
Thus, forms may or may not contain structures. The differentiation between forms containing
structures and forms reducible to structures defines the boundary between reductionist and non-
reductionist theories, as represented for example in the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead 32.
By claiming  that  every form is  reducible  to  structure,  and  assuming  every structure  can  be
represented in a formal language, we claim that everything is reducible to the language of logic
and mathematics, or, equivalently, that the logico-mathematical representation is complete with
respect to the Universe. 
Forms without structures are mental and real forms in which we cannot differentiate any
structure. We can only describe them as a simple, non-definable concept, taken to the limits. This
is how Turek explains this class of forms:
“When we consider Aristotelian prime matter we think about it as being internally shaped by
the form without structure. Thus, we need to have a way of referring to, denoting, something that
is not recognizable to the senses, touching only the material world – a sea of structures delimited
by prime matter”33.
2.3 Information
To define information Turek uses the concept of a substance. In Turek’s view a substance is
not necessarily the Aristotelian substance. It is an individual complex of form and matter, but it
can be anything that can be differentiated as a form-matter composite. Examples of substances
that Turek offers include: language spoken or written, a magnetic tape, a computer punch card, a
chromosome, a man, a computer, and a natural object34. All these entities are concrete and finite
and belong to some genus.
Now, if a substance S1 is constituted, formed, by the finite structure I (a structure with a
finite number of elements), and a substance S2 may be potentially formed by structure I, then we
call this structure I information35. 
Thus, information is a form (in one of three enumerated types) that can either be imposed on
matter (prime matter) or found in substance (form-matter composite). In a case where the form
has  a  structure  (form  1  and  maybe  2)  information  can  be  represented  by  the  logical  and
30   (Turek 1978a).
31   (Turek 1978a).
32    “Achievements of physical sciences appear to demonstrate that nature (its non-living aspects) is shaped by forms 
reducible to structures. One may, however, oppose this view and claim that forms of material, non-living entities, 
cannot be reduced to structures, just as we cannot reduce to form-structures living beings. This is a non-reductionist 
thesis” (Turek 1978a).
33   (Turek 1978a).
34   (Turek 1978a).
35   (Turek 1978a).
6mathematical  formalisms.  Information must  be,  or  is,  what  is  realizable,  what  is  realized,  in
substance (understood as above). 
Structures that are infinite and conceptual or express categories or genus are not information
in the sense defined by Turek. The nature of such abstract structures is different from the nature of
structures defined here36. 
Turek also recognizes the concept of  information as a representation of the multitude of
forms. This is more or less the concept of information as defined by Hartely37. The number of bits
in this approach is a measure of the complexity of a finite structure. This number of bits is defined
as information “or an amount of information or simply a number”38,  Turek concludes. Such a
definition of information is not opposed to Turek’s concept. It represents a completely different
idea.
2.4 Structure of Reality and Set Theory
Reality,  the  word-as-it-is,  is  characterized  by  existence  of  many things  (see  the  earlier
example of the collection of balls) sharing the same essences. The structure of reality, in which
the  same  essences  exist  in  many  things,  is  called  a  genus-individual  structure39.  A genus-
individual structure is defined by three concepts: genus, individual, and membership or affiliation.
These are primitive, non-definable concepts, relating to basic properties of reality40. 
In the set  theory the concepts of a set  and the elements of sets  are also primitive,  non-
definable  concepts41.  Sets  are  usually  specified  by  an  example  without  any  ontological
underpinning. A set is a mental construct42, not in principle any representation of reality. The set
theory may be founded on a set of axioms like the Zelmero axioms (Z). Now, the system of
concepts is as follows: a set, a member of a set, and membership of a set with axioms we may call
a structure of a set. 
Despite similarities, a genus-individual structure (genus, member of a genus, and affiliation)
and the structure of a set are not equivalent: 
“Each genus-individual  structure may be represented by the set,  but  each set  cannot be
represented by a genus-individual structure”43. 
Sets can be constructed with Z axioms, which cannot constitute a genus. A set of apples, cars
36   We stop short here of crossing into the nominalism-realism controversy, leaving this interpretation of structures to 
some other opportunity.
37   (Hartley 1927).
38   (Turek 1978a).
39   ‘Genus-individual structure’ is almost a word-for-word translation of Turek’s concept of ‘struktury gatunkowo-
jednostkowej’. 
40   “Neither a genus nor an individual can be defined, as these concepts cannot be separated. Defining an individual 
by its membership in a genus, or defining genus by indicating individuals belonging to it, does not define either of 
them; it defines only their co-relation.” (Turek 1978b).
41   “We do not define either the set or the element of a set; their meanings can be understood intuitively (not needing 
definition). However, we say that a set is any collection of definite, distinguishable objects, and we call these objects 
the elements of the set.” (Karoly 2015).
42   “Sets are not objects of the real world. They are created by our minds. A heap of potatoes is not a set of potatoes; 
the set of all molecules in a drop of water is not the same object as that drop of water. The human mind possesses the 
ability to abstract, to think of a variety of different objects as being bound together by some common property, and thus
to form a set of objects having this property. The property in question may be nothing more than the ability to think of 
these objects (as being) together.” (Hrbacek & Jech 1999).
43   (Turek 1978b).
7and monkeys is an example of such a set. A genus represents reality, the properties of nature; a set
is only a mental construct (as explained in the footnote) that represents our ability to mentally
group concepts.
The critical  difference between a genus-individual  structure  and the structure  of a set  is
contained in the Axiom of Extensionality, which states that two sets are equal (i.e., are the same)
if they have the same elements. 
The  membership  of  a  genus  is  defined  not  by membership  of  its  elements  but  by  the
possession by the elements of a genus of some common essence. Thus, 
“When we try to substitute the concept of genus with the concept of a set we are losing the
essence of what genus is. We still can create the mental object as a set of members of a genus, but
such a construct would not possess its essence. Any description of the real world that uses the
theory of sets is then incomplete, as it abstracts from what genus is. This is a price we have to pay
for the clarity offered by the abstract theory”44. 
3. Turek on the Shannon/Wiener Concept of Information
Turek provides an interesting interpretation of Shannon’s concept of information45. He writes:
”...  Wiener  and  Shannon  considered  finite  structures  and  denoted  them as  information.
Abstract interpretations of information detached this concept from individual things and allowed
a  ‘new’ means  of  representing  several  scientific  problems.  In  this  way  one  of  the  oldest
philosophical concepts imposes itself on the consciousness of 20 th-century people, but under a
very limited and restricted meaning and under the old name. More and more, we talk not about
the understanding but about the communication of information. Again we see here the return to
the  Aristotelian  thought,  though  significantly  impoverished,  according  to  which  cognition  is
understood as an imprint of the form of the world on the mind”46.
Turek’s interpretation agrees with many modern views on Shannon’s communication theory
and its distance to the concept of information understood more broadly than just as a numerical
property of digitized sequences of signs47. Shannon’s concept of information is constructed with
the  clear  goal  of  measuring  the  capacity  and  efficiency  of  a  communication  channel  for
transferring text (or symbolic) messages. And it works well in this context. The problems begin
when  the  concept  is  extended  beyond  its  original  context  and  regarded  as  a  ‘measure’ 48.
44    (Turek 1978b).
45   (Shannon 1948). An edition with invaluable glosses on Shannon’s work (Shannon & Weaver 1964).
46   (Turek 1978b).
47   See (Pierce 1961), (Cherry 1978).
48   “In 1948, Claud Shannon published a paper called ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’. This paper 
heralded a transformation in our understanding of information. Before Shannon’s paper, information had been viewed 
as a kind of poorly defined miasmatic fluid. But after Shannon’s paper, it became apparent that information is a well-
defined and, above all, measurable quantity. Shannon’s theory describes a subtle theory which tells us something 
fundamental about the way the universe works.” (Stone 2015).  The author places too much emphasis on the calculus of
probability; the fact that something can be computed does not make it real, and does not even explain its nature, as the 
example of energy (or gravity or other physical phenomena) shows. Shannon’s theory is about how to reproduce a 
message on the basis of its symbolic codification. A message (defined not as some meaning but as a sequence of empty 
signs) and the transmission of it have nothing to do with information as commonly understood, but everything to do 
with telecommunication, and this has to be kept in mind. Shannon’s conclusions regarding the importance of low-
probability messages, or uncertainty and information, make perfect sense if and when applied within the reference 
model to coding, decoding or compressing of the transmission signal.
 Pierce writes: “Primarily, however, communication theory is, as Shannon described it, a mathematical theory of 
8Shannon’s ‘information’ means something different to the ancient and traditional term49. Similar is
true for Shannon’s use of entropy50.
4. Turek’s Information and Hylomorphism
Turek defines a formal ontology of information and provides its interpretation using the set
theory formalism. The price paid for this is the use of Aristotelian-like concepts such as form,
prime matter, substance, and essence. The meaning of these terms is very restricted, almost non-
Aristotelian,  one could say,  or  very technical.  This  approach prevents  Turek’s  proposal  from
being overloaded with defunct Aristotelian metaphysical notions and consequences (Aristotle’s
theory of mind and soul), which usually of course is easily done51. What would happen to Turek’s
proposal if the Aristotelian concept of the form-matter composite (even if restricted) were shown
to be lacking?
The form-matter composition that is at the foundation of Turek’s proposal may explain the
existence of similar balls (see Turek’s example above). However, it seems to break down (at least
following the example of the balls) when trying to explain forms of nature that are unique and
result from many interacting environmental conditions. Examples include mountains, snowflakes,
shapes of rivers, or systems of underground caves or calcite formations; all of these result from
the dynamic interaction of changing environmental forces52. These objects did not have any form
imposing its shape on the matter; they were more or less created ‘on-the-go’. 
 
It seems that the example of chaotic structures (referring to natural objects) should force the
rethinking of the form-matter concept inherited from Aristotle, as well as the whole concept of
information  based  on  the  idea  of  the  (static)  form (i.e.,  as  some  static  factor  imposing  or
bestowing some structure). In the case of chaotic phenomena a ‘form’ is a dynamic process rather
than an ‘Aristotelian statue’. Thus, we could think of the form-matter composite as an interplay of
physical forces dynamically acting within the constraints of nature, unfolding as they interact. Of
course, such an idea would require further elaboration53. 
communication. The concepts are formulated in mathematical terms, of which widely different physical examples can 
be given. Engineers, psychologists, and physicists may use communication theory, but it remains a mathematical theory
rather than a physical or psychological theory, or an engineering art”. Pierce. Symbols, Signals.... op. cit. p. 9. Pierce is
trying to point to problems with the interpretation of Shannon’s information, stating that “pictures of completely 
random patterns are mathematically most surprising [informative, according to Shannon’s theory] but the dullest of all 
patterns, and to a human being one random pattern looks like another.” (Pierce 1961).
49   See footnote 40.
50    Pierce writes: “We see that the ideas which gave rise to the entropy of physics and the entropy of communication 
theory are quite different. One can be fully useful without any reference at all to the other.” He goes on: “Several 
physicists and mathematicians have been anxious to show that communication theory and its entropy are extremely 
important in connection with statistical mechanics. This is still a confused and confusing matter. The confusion is 
sometimes aggravated when more than one meaning of information creeps into a discussion. Thus, information is 
something associated with the idea of knowledge through its popular use rather than with uncertainty and with 
resolution of uncertainty.” (Pierce 1961).    And: “ So in Shannon’s language, information and entropy are functionally 
equivalent because the number of bits you need to specify the message (Shannon’s information) is a function of the 
number of possible messages that could be transmitted (the multiplicity of states, which we know as entropy). Yet, this 
does not make entropy and information the same thing. (Hidalgo 2015). For a really down-to-earth discussion of this 
topic see (Libbs 2012). Just a short quotation from this work’s opening page gives a sense of the content: “The 
equations used in communication theory have absolutely nothing to do with equations used in thermodynamics, 
statistical mechanics, or statistical thermodynamics”. These opinions do not prevent many from holding diametrically 
opposed views about entropy and communication theory.
51   See the discussion on the shift from forming to communicating the concept of information in (Capurro 2009).
52   (Kaye 1993). 
53   The hylomorphism (or some form of it) cannot be easily dismissed. As Werner Heisenberg observed, 
what we call matter is in fact a field of potentiality more akin to the shapeless prime matter of Aristotle than
to the solid thing we imagine matter to be. “In experiments about atomic events we have to do with things 
9It  is worth posing the question of whether Whitehead’s 54 ideas about processes in nature
would provide some help in reformulating the concept of a form as a dynamic (Whitehead), rather
than static (Aristotle) shaping factor55.
In evaluating, or criticizing, Turek’s ideas one needs to take into account the fact that the
form-matter theory was always controversial, and that, historically, there was no single agreed-
upon  version  but  rather  many,  frequently  conflicting  interpretations 56.  No  theory  based  on
Aristotelian concepts of form-matter can therefore be accepted without question.
5. The Concept of Information Today and Turek’s model
Concepts of information (Capurro 2009, Nafria 2010) can be categorized, probably with 
some exceptions, as either  epistemological or ontological (Krzanowski 2016). Epistemological 
definitions see information as phenomenon dependent on the existence of conscious mind with 
the obvious corollary that in the absence of the mind no information would exist. Ontological 
definitions define information as   fundamental elements, if not foundational, of nature, existing 
whether or not there is a  mind to perceive it. In some models, unfortunately,  ontological and 
epistemological distinctions are lost  (Gitt 2002, von Weizsacher 1971).
Table 1 below lists the main features of ontological and epistemological models. The listing is not
exhaustive, but selective.
Model
Category
Main Characteristics Selected Authors
Epistemological
 
●       Information results from the mind 
interacting with nature; it is what the 
mind abstracts from the natural 
phenomena
●       The mind can be an origin or a 
receiver of information
●       Information can be communicated,
created, or destroyed 
●       Information is often recognized as 
knowledge
Hartley (1927),Shannon 
(1948), Shannon & Weaver 
(1964), Cherry ( 1978)
Chaitin (2005, 2006, 2007), 
Floridi (2004, 2009, 
2010abc) 
 
Ontological
 
●       Information is a foundational 
element of  nature, possibly together 
Turek (1978ab), 
von Weizsacher (1971), 
and facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But atoms and the 
elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather 
than one of things or facts ... The probability wave ... mean[s] a tendency towards something. It’s a 
quantitative version of the old concept of potentia from Aristotle’s philosophy. It introduces something 
standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality 
just in the middle between possibility and reality.” (Herbert 1985). Thus, if there is a prime matter (pure 
potentiality) then the shaping factor should exist. We may call this a form.
54 (Whitehead 1957).
55   The question with respect to the nature of form is this: Is a form a static, a priori, given complex, or is it a dynamic, 
shaping phenomenon? Turek’s definition of information may seem to attribute both natures.
56   “The historical record suggests that ... there has never been any such thing as the theory of form and matter. 
Although medieval philosophers of all kinds used this terminology incessantly, it had no more fixed meaning than does 
the ubiquitous contemporary talk of ‘properties.’”(Pasnau 2015).
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with energy/matter
●       Information is perceived as a 
structure, form, or organization. It can be
perceived as an invariant element 
behind  mathematical models of natural 
phenomena
●       It is a static (structure) or a 
dynamic (shaping and transforming) 
element in nature
Stonier (1990), Heller 
(2009),
Dodig_Crncovic (2012), 
Hidalgo (2015)
Table 1. Classification of information concepts.
This classifications may be further simplified, as  the ontological perspective appears to be more 
fundamental than the epistemological one (Krzanowski 2016). In this view epistemological 
aspects of information are derived from the ontological properties of nature, thus are secondary 
to, or dependent on, the ontological level. 
Turek’s information model obviously belongs to the ontological category  together with the 
models proposed by  Hidalgo, Heller,  Dodig_Crncovic and others. All these models  postulate  
the existence of information as a forming  element of nature, not dependent on the existence of 
the mind and is not perceived as knowledge. The main assumptions of these models are 
summarized in Table 2 below. The comparison between Turek and more recent ontological 
models in Table 2 is instructive as it shows how understanding of information  has evolved over 
past years.
Author of the
concept
Main claims postulated by the model
von Weizsacher 
(1971)
 
• Information is the third thing, independent of matter or 
consciousness
• Information may be understood only in the context of the 
pair matter-form
• Information may be understood as a form or a structure
• Information is not a visible form, but a form at the higher 
level of abstraction
Stonier (1990)
 
• Information is the third, besides matter and energy 
constitutional element of nature
• All organized structures contain information
• Increase in information is expressed in the increased 
organization of the system
• Information may be transferred or released by an organized
system
Heller (2009)
 
• The world contains information encoded in its structures; 
the world is a structure or information and  information 
saturates and creates the world
• We cannot currently distinguish between structures in 
nature and their content; we cannot decide whether 
information is a structure or it is contained in the structure
• Information may be what is invariant in models of nature
1
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Dodig_Crncovic 
(2012)
• Information is a fundamental ontological category
• Patterns are information
• Information is a fabric of reality
Hidalgo (2015) • Information has physical origins
• The physical order is information; information is not a 
thing
• Information is not incorporeal but it is always physically 
embodied.
 
Table 2. Selected ontological models of information.
Probably the most prominent feature in the above models is the departure from the Aristotelian 
hylomorphism (with the exception of von Weizsacher); hylemorphism is not considered as a 
viable option for the description of nature anymore.  All authors do agree that information exists 
as a basic element of nature and that it finds expression in patterns or organization. The most 
recent addition is the proposal that the nature processes are in fact information processing 
phenomena (Dodig_Crncovic). Thus, in describing the nature of information researchers do agree
that information is related or expressed through structures or order in things, that it is an 
ontological category and that probably is not directly perceivable. There is no agreement on 
whether information is a structure or is in structures and if it is, what is its essence. What the 
proposed models of information are missing are the bridging concepts allowing  information to be
expressed in a formal language. This “bridging concept” can be found in Turek’s work.
6. Conclusions
Turek’s concept of information is constructed using the concept of a form-matter composite.
It is a type of form that may be reduced to, or be made equivalent to, structure. It cannot exist on
its  own  and  is  fused  with  matter,  but  no  priority  is  given  to  either  of  the  two  elements.
Information is embodied in individual substances, but not in the understanding of Aristotle, and
does not exist as some kind of universal idea. 
The structure of individual substances (as defined by Turek) is in some ways analogous to
the  Z  axiomatic  set  theory.  Turek  stipulates  that  the  set  theory  may  be  used  to  represent
information as embodied structures. While Turek’s conceptualization of information and its link
to Z axiomatic set theory is interesting, it is certainly not complete. The question remains open as
to whether the Z axiomatic set theory is the right formalism for information, or whether some
other approaches proposed recently (e.g.,  mereology and mereotopology) should be preferred,
particularly as  such  approaches  seem already to  be  linked  to  ontology through  the  work  of
Husserl57. 
Despite certain conceptual problems Turek’s concept of information seems similar to those
being supported by current research in the field (with the exception of information models based
on  the  communication  paradigm,  of  course).  Turek’s  limited  concepts  of  form,  matter,  and
substance  find  some  analogues  in  modern  physics  (see  footnote  59).  Thus,  despite  being  of
Aristotelian origin, these concepts seem to retain their validity in this reduced, modern shape. The
57   (Husserl 2001.)
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proposal  to  express  information-structures  in  the  set  theory  formalism,  even  if  incomplete,
parallels modern research into the formal ontologies of the real world, or structures. One should
also observe that, in general, Aristotelian concepts are not dead; they are very much alive and are
undergoing  constant  discussion58 to  find  coherent  modern  interpretations,  consistent  with  our
evolving  understanding  of  nature.  Thus,  we  can  conclude,  without  risk  of  drifting  into
philosophical backwaters,  that Turek presents very interesting ideas for the development of a
formal description of information, even if his ideas require further refinement.
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